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MONARCH, LACKEY, OR JUDGE
ALBERT W. ALSCHULER*
Marvin Frankel and Leonard Orland sometimes seem to be
on the verge of disagreeing with one another. 1 So far as I can tell,
however, they never do. At one or two points in his remarks,
Frankel even appears to disagree with me, but perhaps he has me
mixed up with someone else.
Truly, I do not blame sentencing guidelines for plea bargain-
ing, for the severity revolution of the past fifteen years, or for
mandatory minimum sentences. Those things can be found in
jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines and in jurisdictions without
them. My claims have been more limited-principally that a policy
of restricting judicial but not prosecutorial discretion is incoherent.
All of Frankel's objections to judicial sentencing discretion apply
in full measure to the discretion that prosecutors and defense
attorneys exercise in plea bargaining. A policy that restricts the
discretion of judges but not prosecutors cannot notably advance
the goal of greater certainty in sentencing. Such a policy concen-
trates discretion in the hands of a single official and tends to make
the benefits of discretion available only to defendants who abandon
the right to trial.
Again, my objection is not that guidelines increase the amount
of plea bargaining-something that would seem nearly impossible
when ninety-three percent of all state felony convictions are by
guilty plea. 2 It is that when guidelines ignore the most important
part of the sentencing process, they cannot accomplish their goal.
Moreover, even when the amount of plea bargaining remains the
same, guidelines may enhance the power of prosecutors to deter-'
mine sentences. For many defendants, the entry of a guilty plea
is virtually a foregone conclusion, and guidelines may leave only
the prosecutor in a position to give these defendants a break. The
overall enhancement of prosecutorial power does depend, however,
on the severity of the guidelines.'
* Wilson-Dickinson Professor, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing
Commissions and Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 655 (1993).
2. RICHARD SOLARI, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
NATIONAL JUDICIAL REPORTING PROGRAM, 1988, at 47 tbl. 4.2a (1992). In the 75 largest
counties, 94% of all felony convictions are by plea. Id. at tbl. 4.2b.
3. See Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique
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Leonard Orland has recounted some of the empirical evidence
concerning plea bargaining in jurisdictions with sentencing guide-
lines,4 and there is more. For example, both the Minnesota guide-
lines (the academy's favorites) and the Washington guidelines
(number two on the academic hit parade) appear to have increased
the frequency of charge-reduction plea bargaining.' My objection
to tying the hands of judges while allowing prosecutors to deter-
mine the sentences of defendants who plead guilty, however, does
not depend on how often the evil materializes. In my view, a
regime in which mercy can be given is preferable to a regime in
which mercy can only be sold.
Similarly, I do not claim that guidelines have produced the
severity revolution-only that they have not slowed this revolution
appreciably. Contrary to Leonard Orland's hope, guidelines have
not acted "as a buffer, shielding the legislature from the political
pressures to respond to ever increasing demands for punitive sanc-
tions." ' In Florida, the sentencing commission has in fact pro-
posed tougher sentences than the legislature has been willing
to approve.7
A policy against expanding prison capacity has slowed the
severity revolution in Minnesota and Washington.' Prison capacity
constraints, however, should not be confounded with sentencing
guidelines. Either measure can (and does) exist without the other.
In the absence of other objectives, as Kay Knapp notes, 9 the goal
of matching sentences to resources can best be implemented through
administrative mechanisms at the back end of the criminal justice
system, not through front-end sentencing guidelines. Moreover,
Minnesota's generally successful policy of keeping prison popula-
of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550,
568-69 (1978).
4. Frankel & Orland, supra note 1, at 667-69.
5. See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, ET AL., THE SENTENCING COMMSSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 16, 38-42 (1987). Cf.
Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Judicial Impressions of the Sentencing
Guidelines, FED. SENTENCING REP., Mar./Apr. 1989, at 95 (8307o of the federal district
judges surveyed reported that prosecutors had "frequently" entered post-guidelines plea
agreements providing for the dismissal of provable charges; the other judges said that
prosecutors "sometimes" had done so; and no judge described such agreements as "rare.").
6. Frankel & Orland, supra note 1, at 657.
7. See N. Gary Holten & Roger Handberg, Florida's Sentencing Guidelines: Surviving
- But Just Barely, 73 JUDICATURE 259, 264-65 (1990).
8. See Michael Tonry, The Politics and Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37
CRuaM & DELINQ. 307, 311-13 (1991).
9. Kay A. Knapp, Allocation of Discretion and Accountability Within Sentencing
Structures, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 679 (1993).
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tions within bounds has exacerbated the state's jail crowding.
Minnesota's overall rate of incarceration in felony cases exceeds
the national average.' 0
I have suggested that "aggregated" sentencing-determining
the sentences for many cases all at once-does tend to produce
more severe sentences than individualized sentencing." If Marvin
Frankel disagrees with that proposition (or indeed with anything
else that I have written about plea bargaining, severity, and sen-
tencing guidelines), I hope that he will not be shy. Please, Marvin,
speak up.
Frankel thinks it a trick that I have singled out for comment
guidelines that are foolish, cruel, and silly. He does not favor that
kind. Instead, he prefers wise and beneficent guidelines. Wise and
beneficent guidelines, however, have not been easy to come by.
At the outset of the sentencing reform movement, many of
us did not realize that. Judges, we said, must have implicit sen-
tencing policies. Let's spell these policies out or even improve
them. Let's regularize the actual or, better still, develop thoughtful,
comprehensive, and coherent sentencing policies of our own. We'll
rein in the outliers and reduce disparity. We can hire wise and
knowledgeable sentencing commissioners to do the job.
Describing the appropriate influence of situational and per-
sonal characteristics on punishment has proven difficult, however.
Sentencing commissions can quantify harms more easily than they
can quantify circumstances. These commissions have counted the
stolen dollars, weighed the drugs, and forgotten about more im-
portant things. Like the Minnesota and Washington commissions,
many have grounded their guidelines largely on sweeping statutory
definitions of offenses. Then they have included situational and
personal characteristics in catch-all, non-exclusive lists of possible
grounds for depar'ture. Guidelines of this sort may not greatly
confine discretion. To the extent that they make a difference,
however, they tend to become crime tariffs." They focus on harms
rather than people primarily because it is easier to write them that
way.
To appreciate the difficulty of avoiding guidelines of the kind
that Marvin Frankel does not like, try your hand at proposing
10. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Reform in Minnesota, Ten Years After: Reflections
on Dale G. Parent's Structuring Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota's Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 75 MINN. L. REv. 727, 736, & n.41 (1991).
11. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less
Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 901, 937-38 (1991).
12. See text accompanying infra notes 31-36 for further discussion of this issue.
1993]
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wise and beneficent sentencing guidelines for drug cases. Should
you start with drug quantity? The weight of the drugs involved in
a transaction does seem relevant.
But what quantity should you weigh? Offender A was a
''mule" or courier who did not know what type of drug she was
carrying let alone how much of this drug there was. Should you
weigh the drug anyway? Offender B was a crop duster who know-
ingly sprayed a field, of marihuana. Should you count the plants
in the field and multiply by 366 grams? Offender C knowingly
drove a friend to a drug transaction. Should you weigh whatever
drugs the friend bought or sold? Offender D unloaded a truck.
Should you weigh all the drugs that this offender handled? If
Offender D had a helper, should you reduce the amount accord-
ingly? If Offender D offered suggestions to his helper, should you
add the drugs handled by the helper back in? If Offender D also
gave a suggestion to his boss urging her to buy a new truck, should
you weigh whatever drugs the boss's new truck has now carried?
Remember: You are doing this to promote uniformity and ration-
ality in sentencing.
You can allow a two-level adjustment for an offender's minor
role in the offense (that sounds about right, don't you think?),
and you can permit departures. Still, your wise and beneficent
guidelines may begin to look foolish, cruel, and silly. Why not
just weigh the offender and be done with it?"3 Is weighing drugs
the best way to determine how long to lock people up? If, after
some reflection, quantity-based guidelines seem foolish, cruel, and
silly, what new, wise, and beneficent guidelines will you propose?
Marvin Frankel is confident that good people like you are equal
to the task.
Once you abandon the premise that sentencing guidelines must
be comprehensive-that every case must have its box-ways to
solve the "silliness" problem while affording substantial guidance
to sentencing judges appear. I have written about how to draft
kinder, gentler, wiser, and more beneficent guidelines myself,' 4 and
I will say more about kinder, gentler guidelines at the end of these
remarks. I, too, favor the rule of law. At the level of generality
at which Marvin Frankel invites debate, he will not get much from
me.
13. See United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1333 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
14. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 939-49.
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He will, however, get plenty from Kay Knapp. Knapp has
come to this conference not to bury judicial discretion but to praise
it. She contends that judges are the most accountable actors in
the criminal justice system and that the principal function of
guidelines is to give them more power. Frankel speaks of the
"sweeping, essentially unreviewable power" of judges in pre-guide-
lines jurisdictions, 5 but Knapp declares that judicial discretion was
all but nonexistent in these jurisdictions. Where Frankel describes
pre-guidelines sentencing as a "stark, classic regime of arbitrary
power,' '16 Knapp writes, "Enhancement of judicial discretion has
been fundamental to guideline development.' 1 7 With both Frankel
and Knapp on this program, a critic of state sentencing guidelines
must aim at a rapidly moving target.
I doubt that either Frankel or Knapp has the correct answer
to the empirical question that divides them-whether judges in
pre-guidelines jurisdictions were monarchs or lackeys. Frankel tends
to overlook the back end of the criminal justice system, and Knapp
tends to overlook the back end of her paper. Parole boards in
pre-guidelines regimes reduced the sentencing disparity that might
have been created by the varying outlooks of judges and prose-
cutors. These boards and other authorities kept sentencing judges
from exercising anything like the power that Frankel attributes to
them. At the same time, the choice between prison and probation
was a front-end decision shared by prosecutors and judges. Knapp,
whose paper concludes with a thoughtful discussion of alternatives
to incarceration, seems strangely to disregard the in-out decision
in her earlier discussion of judicial power.
Although pre-guidelines judges may not have been the last of
the absolute monarchs, Knapp's claim that the purpose of sen-
tencing guidelines was to enhance these judges' discretion ought
to cause jaws to drop and eyes to gape. Especially when Marvin
Frankel, the founding father of the sentencing reform movement,
stands before us, such revisionist history is breathtaking.
Knapp writes: "The rallying cry of the most recent successful
presidential campaign, 'It's the economy, stupid!' finds its parallel
... in 'truth in sentencing.' All else is mere detail."' 8
I doubt, however, that you will find the words "truth in
sentencing" in Kay Knapp's writings or in the statements of the
15. Frankel & Orland, supra note 1, at 655.
16. Id.
17. Knapp, supra note 9, at 684 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 686.
1993]
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Minnesota Sentencing Commission a decade ago. You are likely
to find discussions of sentencing disparity instead. I believe that
Knapp changed the sign on the wall of her campaign headquarters
only last year. The new sign reads, "Veritas in poenis dandis," or
"Truth in sentencing." The old one read, "It's the disparity,
stupid.' 19
Knapp speaks of her new motto-truth in sentencing-without
speaking much about truth in sentencing. The people who invented
this motto believed that the public was deceived by indeterminate
sentencing. Because members of the public read the papers, they
knew the sentences announced by judges; but because they did not
read the papers, they knew nothing about parole and other early
release mechanisms.
To the extent that the reformers' concern was justified, 20 the
cure seemed simple. After calculating the earliest possible date of
an offender's release, a judge should have been required to an-
nounce this date through a bullhorn. Truth in sentencing did not
require any change in sentencing structure; it required truth-telling.
That simple solution, however, was not what the reformers had in
mind. Treating the statement, "I sentence you to a term of two
to ten years," as untruthful, the reformers proposed determinate
sentencing and sentencing guidelines.
The reformers' familiar, if misleading, use of the phrase "truth
in sentencing" is only one of Knapp's uses. She writes:
In fact, "truth in sentencing" is used by commissions in several
different senses. One usage refers to judicial control of sen-
tencing as opposed to back-end control. Another usage is close
correspondence between the pronounced sentence and time
served. A third sense of truth in sentencing is adherence to
articulated standards. A final usage is predictability of time
served.2'
An agency that articulates standards should not disregard
them, but I see nothing untruthful in any of the other practices
that Knapp regards as inconsistent with her motto. I have no brief
for regimes of indeterminate sentencing grounded on the view that
19. See, e.g., Kay A. Knapp, Implementation of the Minnesota Guidelines: Can the
Innovative Spirit Be Preserved?, in VON HIRSCH, ET AL., supra note 5, at 127 ("The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, which became effective May 1, 1980, have been hailed
as innovative and successful. The primary goals were to increase uniformity and propor-
tionality in sentencing.").
20. And some sentencing structures were confusing.
21. Knapp, supra note 9, at 685 (emphasis added).
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a parole board can determine when offenders have truly reformed.
When the goal is simply to prevent prison crowding, however, I
do not understand why a system that includes a measure of back-
end decisionmaking cannot be open, principled, and honest. Front-
end projections of prison populations often go off-track. 22 They
have in fact gone off-track in both Minnesota and Washington.
And when prison population projections by sentencing commissions
go off-track, the response is likely to include back-end, ad hoc
adjustments of the sort that Knapp considers dishonest.23 Knapp
reports that substantial back-end discretion has in fact crept into
Minnesota's sentencing system. 24
Knapp writes, "It must be noted that front-end sentencing
authority and judicial sentencing authority are not synonymous.
Prosecutors share, and with mandatory minimums sometimes dom-
inate, front-end sentencing authority. " 25 Prosecutors exercise their
share of front-end sentencing power largely through plea bargain-
ing, and plea bargaining mislabels offenses as defendants plead
guilty to crimes less serious than those that they apparently com-
mitted. In light of this systematic mislabeling, to proclaim that
locating discretion at the front end of the criminal justice system
enhances "truth in sentencing" ought to cause one to gag. 26
22. See Alschuler, supra note II, at 936 ("To [predict future prison populations]
effectively, a commission must guess future crime rates, future arrest rates, future prose-
cutorial charging policies, future plea bargaining practices, and more.").
23. Although front-end decision makers may recognize that correctional resources are
limited, they are likely to focus primarily on the punishments that offenders deserve. Back-
end decision makers are likely to consider more specifically the extent to which limited
resources require the release of inmates who have not fully served their "just" sentences.
Back-end release mechanisms effectively convey the message that the public can be tough
about crime, but only if it is willing to pay the price. Once again, I see nothing dishonest
about placing "justice" specialists at the front end of the sentencing process and "resource"
specialists at the back end. If members of the public are deceived by "front end" sentences
into believing that they can have tough sentences without paying for them, this sort of
arrangement will in fact give them "truth in sentencing."
24. Knapp, supra note 9, at 688-89. The situation in Minnesota, however, is not nearly
as sad as that in Florida, a jurisdiction that has abolished parole and implemented sentencing
guidelines without a clear prison capacity constraint. Florida appears to be holding its
correctional system together with "gain time"- 10 days per month of "statutory gain time"
for obeying institutional rules; as much as 20 days per month of "incentive gain time" for
participating in institutional programs; as much as 60 days of "meritorious gain time" for
every heroic act; and up to 60 days of "administrative gain time" at the end of each
prisoner's sentence. As a result of Florida's repeated liberalization of "gain time," the
average inmate now serves only about 35% of his or her guidelines sentence. Holten &
Handberg, supra note 7, at 264.
25. Knapp, supra note 9, at 684.
26. There is, moreover, considerable irony in insisting that the public be fully informed
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Just as Knapp speaks of truth in sentencing without speaking
much about truth in sentencing, she speaks of sentencing guidelines
without speaking about most sentencing guidelines. First, she ex-
cludes the federal guidelines. 27 Everyone on today's program seems
to agree that these guidelines are a disaster. Knapp also prefers
not to discuss most state guidelines. She writes, "[Rieferences to
sentencing guidelines are to state guidelines systems along the order
of those developed in Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, and Kan-
sas. "
28
Even when Knapp discusses her favorite four, she does not
talk very much about guidelines. She talks mostly about moving
sentencing discretion from the back end of the criminal justice
system to the front end. This change in the locus of authority,
however, has little to do with guidelines. A state can have back-
end discretion with guidelines, back-end discretion without guide-
lines, front-end discretion with guidelines, and front-end discretion
without guidelines. Parole release guidelines preceded the devel-
opment of sentencing guidelines in a number of jurisdictions, and
a number of jurisdictions have abolished discretionary release on
parole without implementing guidelines of any sort.
When talk about guidelines is not much about guidelines,
when talk about truth in sentencing is not much about truth in
sentencing, and when one of America's most respected students of
sentencing turns the principal object of the sentencing reform
movement on its head, one may sense a measure of post hoc
rationalization for a reform that cannot be justified on the grounds
initially offered. Knapp's principal thesis appears to be that a
jurisdiction committed both to abolishing back-end discretion and
to matching sentences to resources must embrace something like
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. As a descriptive matter, her
thesis is accurate, but making the normative case for such a
sentencing system requires more than a slogan on the wall.
through "truth in sentencing" while whispering that sentencing commissions can insulate
the legislature from the public's desire for tough sentences. The goal of "truth in sentencing"
apparently is not to facilitate implementation of the public will.
Knapp herself does not seem enamored of prosecutorial power. She proposes to restrict
this power through "typical case" offense classifications, adequate and timely flow of
information to the sentencing judge from a source independent of the prosecutor, and a
clear declaration that sentencing is a judicial responsibility. These supposed safeguards
currently exist in Minnesota. However, they have not kept prosecutors from entering charge-
reduction plea agreements virtually without restraint. Minnesota judges exercise their dis-
cretion in the interstices that prosecutors leave them.
27. Knapp, supra note 9, at 679-80.
28. Id. at 680.
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Before bringing these remarks to an end, I want to offer an
argument for sentencing guidelines closer to Marvin Frankel's and
Leonard Orland's than to Kay Knapp's. Earlier I asked you to
imagine yourself a sentencing commissioner. Now imagine yourself
a judge who must sentence several defendants convicted of drunk
driving. Doing this job well'will require you to confront a number
of challenging issues.
Should you attempt to distinguish between alcoholic drivers
and drivers who can better control their drinking? Should you
order a medical or psychological examination of each offender to
assess the extent of his or her drinking problem? How frequently
do treatment programs for alcoholism succeed? Can forced treat-
ment work? Should you consider an offender's ability to pay for
treatment in deciding whether to order this treatment? Can treat-
ment justify a greater deprivation of liberty than would be appro-
priate if an offender were simply to be punished? Should offenders
be offered a choice between jail and taking an alcohol-control
medication like Antabuse? Do drinking-driver schools reduce recid-
ivism? Should offenders' names be published in local newspapers,
or should they be required to publicize their convictions by placing
bumper stickers on their cars? When are suspensions and revoca-
tions of drivers' licenses appropriate? Should you sometimes go
beyond licensing restrictions to require the impoundment or for-
feiture of an offender's vehicle? Should you order "shock" incar-
ceration, home detention, community service, or fines? When fines
are imposed, should they be uniform, or should they vary with an
offender's wealth or income? To what extent should your sentences
vary with an offender's level of intoxication, with the quality of
his or her driving, with the commission of other traffic offenses,
with the offender's age, with involvement in a traffic accident
while intoxicated, and with the harm resulting from an accident?
You may be a good and capable judge, but you should not
be expected to address issues of this breadth, consequence, and
difficulty without guidance. Sentencing should not be a game of
"every judge for herself." When it is, judges are certain to disagree
with one another, and troublesome inequalities will result. More-
over, forcing you to consider issues that countless judges before
you have considered and that other judges will consider before the
day's end is a waste of resources. The effort and uncertainty of
your task are likely to cause agony for you, for the defendants
you sentence, and for everyone else.
Moreover, you cannot do the job well. You cannot gather
extensive data concerning the sentencing practices of other juris-
1993l
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dictions throughout America and abroad, the past sentencing prac-
tices of the courts of your own state, the effectiveness of various
treatment programs, and the experiences of knowledgeable judges,
probation officers, and others. You must resolve many critical
issues just by muddling through. No state legislature will provide
the detailed guidance that you need. Only a sentencing commission
can do it.
But no sentencing commission has. For the most part, guide-
lines like Minnesota's and Washington's have incorporated without
refinement the definitions of offenses found in state criminal codes-
declaring, for example, that "driving while intoxicated" is a "level
four offense" on a sentencing grid. Such a declaration submerges
most of the issues worth considering. Rather than give tough,
recurring sentencing issues greater consideration than judges have
provided, sentencing commissions give them less.
Kay Knapp objects that this sort of criticism "overlook[s] the
richness of information embodied in a typical case analysis." ' 29 She
maintains that before classifying offenses, a sentencing commission
considers "[o]ffender characteristics, victim characteristics, and
situational factors." The commission develops a "very rich and
holistic picture of the typical case." 30 There is, however, one
difficulty. After developing its "rich and holistic picture of the
typical case," every sentencing commission including Minnesota's
and Washington's has forgotten to tell us what it is.
I do not know whether the "typical" drunk driver is an
alcoholic or a social drinker, whether his or her blood alcohol
level was barely above the legal limit or much higher, whether he
or she was driving within the speed limit or well above this limit,
and whether he or she caused an accident. Will the typical offender
at the left-hand box of level four of the sentencing grid please
stand up?3
29. Id. at 692 n.45.
30. Id. at 692.
31. In her rejoinder to these comments, Knapp reiterates that criminal justice insiders
understand "typical cases" without being told about them. She writes: "Since Professor
Alschuler is not experienced in the nature of the cases in the various jurisdictions, it is not
surprising that he does not know what typical cases are. Judges, prosecutors, and defenders,
however, have no difficulty discerning them." Kay A. Knapp, A Reply to Professor
Alschuler, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 737, 741 (1993). After reading these comments, I proposed
to Knapp that she and I leave the law library, send a survey to the judges, prosecutors,
and defenders who "have no difficulty discerning what typical cases are," and ask these
practitioners: "Can any case appropriately be described as the 'typical' burglary case?" I
also proposed that we ask about the typical rape case, the typical water pollution case, the
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If sentencing commissions had shared their "rich and holistic
picture of the typical case" with the rest of us, they would have
helped sentencing judges like you. You could compare the features
of any case before you with the features of the commission's
typical case, and the sentence that the commission had prescribed
for the typical case might give you a good sense of the appropriate
sentence for yours. A sentencing commission that resolved recur-
ring sentencing issues and that provided benchmarks, not boxes,
could make a marvelous, lasting contribution to the quality of
criminal justice.
Minnesota's guidelines have not made that contribution, and
whether they have done more good than harm seems to me a close
question. The aficionados of state sentencing guidelines sometimes
have complained that scholars have not given these guidelines the
same attention that they have given the Federal guidelines.3 2 One
reason for this relative neglect may be that most state guidelines
simply have not done very much either for good or for ill. Some
of us predicted at the outset of the reform movement that they
would not. We argued that toying with grids and with theories of
punishment (should the Minnesota sentencing grid have a "just
deserts in-out line" or a "modified just deserts in-out line?")
would remain overly refined scholasticism so long as reformers
averted their eyes from the realities of plea bargaining. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, sentencing reformers seemed reluctant to
address the things most obviously wrong. They fiddled at the
periphery of the criminal justice system, neglecting the conflagra-
tion at the core. Today, after what has probably been the most
disastrous decade in the history of American penology, we continue
to wonder whether anyone will address the obvious problems of
the American criminal justice system-an unwieldy, over-proce-
duralized system that threatens ever-more monstrous penalties in
typical murder case, the typical aggravated assault case, and the typical drunk driving case.
If some respondents surprised me by answering yes to the initial question, I proposed that
we give them four or five lines to describe each of the "typical" cases that they had "no
difficulty discerning." I offered to wager that a substantial majority of the respondents
either would say no to the initial "is there a typical case" question or, if they answered
yes, would describe cases substantially at variance from those described by other respon-
dents. Knapp did not respond to my proposal. I also offered Knapp $100 for any of the
several statements and positions that I believe her rejoinder inaccurately attributed to me-
that is, if she could actually find any of these statements and positions in my writing.
Again, Knapp did not respond.
32. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 9, at 679; Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Reform in
the States: An Overview of the Colorado Law Review Symposium 64 U. CoLo. L. REv.
645 (1993).
19931
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order to persuade defendants to abandon the most basic of their
rights.33
When one evaluates the entire package of reforms accompa-
nying the Minnesota guidelines rather than the guidelines them-
selves, one can easily find things to cheer. Most notably, the efforts
of the Minnesota Sentencing Commission to match sentences to
prison resources were plainly worthwhile. Other states-California,
Colorado, Florida, and Illinois among them-eliminated their cor-
rectional systems' principal "back-end" safety valves just as the
pressire was building. They did so when the safety valves were
most needed, and they did so without providing "front-end"
substitutes. Minnesota's mechanism for matching sentences to re-
sources certainly has proven preferable to no mechanism at all.
One also must count among the reform package's positive features
the systematic collection of sentencing data. Analyses of these data
by people like Knapp and Debra Dailey have increased our un-
derstanding of criminal justice and the accountability of criminal
justice officials. Finally, the appellate review of sentences in Min-
nesota has promoted judicial accountability. Neither the need for
appellate review of sentences nor the need for data collection nor
the need for a means of matching punishment to resources, how-
ever, makes much of a case for sentencing guidelines.
To some extent, the Minnesota guidelines have increased pros-
ecutorial power, and empirical studies claiming that these guidelines
have reduced sentencing disparity are nothing but smoke and
mirrors.34 Moreover, the grid format of the Minnesota guidelines
makes it easy to assign sentences to cases without considering the
cases." Nevertheless, one cannot object very strongly to guidelines
33. Some nice long division by Knapp and a co-author has yielded an arresting
statistic. Dividing the annual budget of the Federal Sentencing Commission by the number
of sentences imposed by the federal courts each year reveals that the federal guidelines cost
$315 per case. Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Guidelines: Apples
and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 679, 688 n.30 (1992) (emphasizing that state costs
are much smaller). In fact, the federal guidelines cost much more than $315 per sentence
imposed, for an accountant would amortize over a period of time the Commission's budgets
during the years before the guidelines went into effect and would add guideline expenses
that have appeared in the budgets of Congress, the Department of Justice, and the courts.
That the federal criminal justice system pays this high price in each case for a functionless
and very ugly gargoyle while insisting that it cannot afford to give the defendant in the
same case a trial reveals the system's topsy-turvy values.
34. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 915-18 ("[G]uidelines have taken out more-or-
less what they have put in, and researchers have concluded in effect, 'Judges in our
guidelines system have come closer to following the guidelines than judges did before the
guidelines were invented."').
35. See id. at 906-08.
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that merely provide a "starting point" for analysis and that require
only a plausible statement of reasons to justify departure. In
operation, the Minnesota guidelines may fit this description, at
least for many judges. The Minnesota Supreme Court generally
has been tolerant of departures.
The guidelines themselves, however, are two-faced on this
subject. On the one hand, they appear to authorize departure for
any reason on their long lists of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances and for other reasons as well. On the other hand, they
forbid departure "unless the individual case involves substantial
and compelling circumstances. 3 6 To the extent that some judges
have taken this admonition against departure seriously (or have
taken the easy course of following the guidelines mechanically),
Minnesota's offense-based guidelines have operated as crude crime
tariffs.
I have no particular objection to the Minnesota guidelines in
so far as they have not restricted discretion, but like Marvin
Frankel, Leonard Orland, and Kay Knapp, I favor the concept of
sentencing guidelines. I wish that some sentencing commission,
somewhere in America, would throw away its grid, focus on
specific paradigmatic cases, resolve recurring sentencing issues, and
do the important work that only a sentencing commission can
do. 37
36. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 App. pt. II.D (West Supp. 1993) (rev. Aug. 1,
1992).
37. In the absence of a direct restriction on plea bargaining, guidelines in the format
that I suggest might, like other guidelines, be subverted by bargaining prosecutors and
defense attorneys. To suppose these guidelines could exert a slight and subtle restraining
influence on the bargaining process, however, might not be too naive. After a sentencing
commission had set forth its "rich and holistic picture of [a series of] typical cases" and
had prescribed a sentence for each of these cases, it would be difficult to view a guideline
sentence simply as a number thrown at a box full of diverse cases by bureaucrats with no
knowledge of the facts of any case. Unlike most current guideline sentences, which prac-
titioners may view merely as the starting point (or the asking price) in plea bargaining,
guidelines in this different format would reflect unmistakably the Sentencing Commission's
focused, authoritative determination of the appropriate response to specific sets of facts.
Practitioners might hesitate to subvert this authoritative determination or at least might
hesitate to subvert it too much. Similarly, if a sentencing commission were to rule particular
responses to particular crimes (fines, electronic monitoring, Antabuse treatment, vehicle
forfeiture, bumper stickers, or whatever) either "in" or "out," both practitioners and
judges might hesitate (at least a little) to reverse its judgments.
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